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INTRODUCTION

The 1970 United Nations Declaration on Friendly Relations forbids
the use of economic or political aid for coercive means to force a
sovereign to act in a manner consistent with the giver's national policy.I

*Professor of Law, University of Florida. B.A., 1958, University of Georgia; J.D., 1961,
University of Georgia; LL.M., 1962, University of Illinois; LL.M., 1968, Yale University.
The author wishes to gratefully acknowledge the assistance of Kim Scalia, Executive Research
Editor of the Journal,and Scott Rogers, Research Assistant, in the preparation of this article.
1. See generally Abbott, Linking Trade to PoliticalGoals: ForeignPolicy Export Controls
in the 1970's and 1980's, 65 MINN. L. REV. 840 (1981). See also Nagan, Economic Sanctions,
U.S. ForeignPolicy, InternationalLaw and the Anti-Apartheid Act of 1986, 4 FLA. INT'L L.J.
85 (1988).
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In the United States a political or economic award with strings
attached has its roots deep in political theory. However, where the
roots should have taken hold - in constitutional theory - they have
not. Allocation of economic largess does not appear to interfere with
tenets of domestic law; the concept does at times do violence under
certain specific circumstances to international law.2 In United States
largess lexicon, economic allocation to debtor nations is usually subject
to the political goals of the United States executive branch. Economic
allocation can become economic sanctions when the former unsuccessfully serves as the means of altering an undesirable specific political
course of action.
Although for different reasons, both Poland and South Africa have
been in the case of Poland or continue to be in the case of South
Africa, recipients of United States executive sanctions.3 Prior to President Reagan's invocation of economic and political "sanctions" as a
means of reinforcing the United States agenda for substantive change

2. The question of the last part of the 20th Century seems to be: What can be done to
control or direct the activities of the nations in the world along peaceful paths? Is there some
way that the controls used by municipal law over the individual inhabitants of the particular
country involved can be copied to apply on a macro-scale? It is newly recognized under the
Nuremberg laws that individual citizens of a nation may be prosecuted under "The Nuremberg

Principles." See O'Brien, The Nuremberg Principles, in 3 R.

FALK, THE VIETNAM WAR AND
INTERNATIONAL LAW 193 (1972). The Nuremberg International Military Tribunal was endorsed

by 23 members of the wartime "United Nations" to try the "major" German war criminals. Id.
at 193-4. The London Charter, annexed to the London Agreement of August 8, 1945, established
the Tribunal. Id. at 193. The legal basis for the trial was that the United Nations had the right
to try captured enemies for the violation of the international law of war and that the victorious
Allies had the right to try German generals who would have been subject to the jurisdiction of
the deposed German state. Id. at 194. The military tribunal was empowered to try war criminals
"whose offenses had no particular geographical location." Id.
When it comes to the conduct of nations, not individuals, engaged in violation of the International Legal Order, national policy focus has a different problem. The way to "punish" or
"encourage" a nation is by sanctions, political or economic. The most publicized successful sanctions authorized by the U.N. were those imposed in an attempt to change the internal politics
of Rhodesia towards its black inhabitants. For the background, see McDougal & Reisman,
Rhodesia and the United Nations: The Lawfulness of InternationalConcern, 62 AM. J. INT'L
L. 1 (1968). The U.S. had obeyed this ukase (1968) by virtue of U.N. Participation Act as
amended. 22 U.S.C. § 287(c). This sanction was revoked by Publ. L. 96-60, Title IV. § 408
(Aug. 15, 1979) 92 Stat. 40, since Congress found that the elections held in April, 1979, in which
Zimbabwe-Rhodesia approved through elections, the transfer of power to a black majority
government. One of the problems with economic sanctions is that so often they are imposed in
a manner which is more subtle than real.
3. See, e.g., Nagan, supranote 1. See also Baldwin, United States ConstitutionalAllocation
of Power Impacting Upon Eastern European Trade, 3 FLA INT'L L.J. 1, 19, n.80 (1987).
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in the political-social context of Poland, a lengthy process of socialization, indoctrination, and communalization occurred. 4 A free state can
usually protect itself and its existing social order, as well as the political
order, by insuring economic and political stability, thus strengthening
a response to external pressure devices. However, when Poland was
removed from "most favored status," a sanction administered by
former President Ronald Reagan, times were at best atypical. Thus,
the United States was able to bypass the traditional diplomatic
methodology for change. 5
Although ostensibly unsophisticated in their degree of institutionalization, the strategies of President Reagan's foreign policy
makers appeared to be meandering down political, not constitutional

4. Baldwin, supra note 3, at 22-23. See generally Shaw, The PoliticalEconomy of Self-Determination:A World Systems Approach to Human Rights and Development in Africa, in C.
WELCH, JR.

& R.

MELTZER,

HUMAN

RIGHTS AND DEVELOPMENT IN AFRICA

(1984), and

Chen, Self-Determination as an Human Right, in W. REISMAN & B. WESTON, TOWARD
WORLD ORDER AND HUMAN DIGNITY: ESSAYS IN HONOR OF MYRES S. McDOUGAL

(1976).

Cf U.N. CHARTER, art. 1, para. 2; International Convention on Civil and Political Rights, art.
1, 21 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 16) at 52, U.N. Doe. A/6316 (1967); International Covenant on
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, art. 1, 21 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 16) at 66, U.N. Dc.
A/4684 (1961); SUMIDA, THE RIGHT OF REVOLUTION: IMPLICATIONS FOR INTERNATIONAL
LAW AND ORDER IN POWER AND LAW

(1971); Nagan, Law and Post-Apartheid South Africa,

presented at the University of Pittsburgh, Mar. 18, 1988; The African Charteron Human and

Peoples' Rights, in C. WELCH,

JR.

& R.

MELTZER, HUMAN RIGHTS AND DEVELOPMENT IN

(1984); M.J.K. Nyerere on The Arusha Declaration Teach-In, Aug. 5, 1967, Hodgkin,
The Relevance of "Western" Ideas for the New African States, in R. PENNOCK, SELF GOVERN-

AFRICA

(1964); and E. Kannyo, The Banjul Charteron Human and
Peoples' Rights: Genesis and PoliticalBackground, in C. WELCH, JR. & R. MELTZER, HUMAN
RIGHTS AND DEVELOPMENT IN AFRICA (1984).
MENT IN MODERNIZING NATIONS

5. The point is essentially a general point about the problem of the limitations that ought
to govern the exercise of political power. These may be found in the general writings of natural
law tradition which prescribe trans-empirical limitations on the exercise of governmental power,
or in refined versions of positivism that seek to limit governmental power by subjecting it to
rule. In more general terms, the idea of constitutionalism implies the notion of governance
subject to the legal limitations prescribed by constitutional expectations. Hence, there is identification in whatever degree of efficacy in constitutionalism with the rule of law which implies
a rule of restraint or limitation. The problem, viewed from a global perspective, suggests the
existence of an international rule of law that does not exclude the rights and responsibilities
inherent in the major purpose of the U.N. Charter and the International Bill of Rights. International law, in this broad sense, requires limitations on the exercise of state power if the rule
of law, in this comprehensive sense, is to have meaning. See generally M. McDOUGAL, THE
APPLICATION OF CONSTITUTIVE PRESCRIPTIONS: AN ADDENDUM TO JUSTICE CARDOZO
(1978); M. McDOUGAL, H. LASWELL & L. CHEN, HUMAN RIGHTS AND WORLD PUBLIC

ORDER (1980); McDougal, Laswell & Reisman, The World Constitutive Process of Authoritative

Decision, in M.

McDOUGAL

& W.

REISMAN, INTERNATIONAL LAW ESSAYS:

A

SUPPLEMENT

TO INTERNATIONAL LAW IN CONTEMPORARY PERSPECTIVE (1981).
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lines. 6 Their invocation of an appeal to public order allowed them to
employ, and when necessary implement, unrestrained political rhetoric
because they were able to ignore fear of domestic checks upon possible
international misdirection. In response to the delineation of the presidential course of action, the process of benefits became more readily
susceptible to consideration of its component parts. Once again, unchecked economic power was demonstrated by the President; it was
unchecked by judicial constraints or legislative agendas. The author
believes that every economic showering cycle contains four stages
worthy of consideration:
1. Formulation of Policy: Role of Domestic Decision Makers.
2. Formulation of Means to Accomplish Policy by the Ultimate
Authority.
3. Participation in the Actual Means of International "Most Favored Nation" Selections.
4. Participation before Authoritative Decision Makers wherein
Claims are Presented on Behalf of the Public Order Countering International Policy.
Each of the stages of the process is subjected to a phase analysis.
To understand the role of the executive, it is essential to consider
both the invocation and the processes of public order claims within
the context of judicial counter aliegations which tend to abrogate responsibility. The claims made by each party must be analyzed in light
of a pervasive goal other than the immediacy of protecting the domestic
public goals in the international arena. A sterile value judgment must
be subjected to contextual and contemporary evaluation.
While updating the conference paper, this article examines the
present posture of the executive with respect to Poland by tracing
the executive's inherent authority to regulate and control - for whatever domestic benefit - economic or political largess. Within this
context, this article will review the role of the President in international affairs with a review of the court and its abdication from international policy considerations. 7 This article will then explore the executive's direction within the context of Poland keeping in mind that
conditions are, in Central and Eastern Europe, changing daily.

6. W. Reisman, A Theory About Law From the Policy Perspective, in WEISSTUB, LAW
AND PC5LICY 78 (1976). See also United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304

(1936); and D. BowEr,

SELF-DEFENSE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW

(1958).

7.

Id. See generally the works of H. Laswell. See, e.g., H. LASWELL, PSYCHOPATHOLOGY
AND POLITICS (1930); H. LASWELL, WORLD POLITICS AND PERSONAL INSECURITY (1935);
H. LASWELL, POLITICS: WHO GETS WHAT, WHEN AND How (1936); POWER AND PERSON-
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II.

THE OBLIGATION OF THE EXECUTIVE:
THE "FAITHFULLY EXECUTE" CLAUSE

United States Presidents have long argued that the "faithfully
execute" clause of Article II of the United States Constitution confers
the right to selectively enforce or "harmonize" allegedly conflicting
statutes involving federal law. 8 Many chief executives have interpreted
"faithfully execute" as a grant of discretion and authority in both
national and international affairs. In fact, the "faithfully execute"
clause represents a duty to perform rather than a grant of discretion. 9
The United States Supreme Court in Youngstown Sheet & Tube
Co. v. Sawyer, 10 examined this issue on its way to striking down the
President's attempted seizure of steel mills. Although with a degree
of timidity, the Court held that the seizure could not be justified under
the President's constitutional powers. In rejecting an amendment
granting power to seize private industries in emergencies,"l the Congress in 1947 expressed its view that it would prefer to deal with
such problems itself on an ad hoc basis pursuant to presidential recommendations. 12 The court thus established the policy that a President
cannot unilaterally do that which he can only recommend. As Justice
Clark argued in his concurring opinion, "[W]here Congress has laid
down specific procedures to deal with the type of crisis confronting
the President, he must follow those procedures in meeting the crisis."11
Moreover, as Youngstown has determined, when a subject is within
the purview of congressional power, and Congress has acted, the President may not act in contravention of the stated legislative policy.14
Reason and precedent dictate that the direction to "faithfully execute"
is not a carte blanche to arbitrarily invest in foreign affairs.15 As the

POWER AND SOCIETY (1950); H. LASWELL, A PREVIEW OF
(1971). See also M. McDOUGAL, H. LASWELL, & ASSOCIATES, STUDIES
IN WORLD PUBLIC ORDER (1978).
8. U.S. CONST. art. II § 3. See generally Kauper, The Steel Seizure Case: Congress, the
President and the Supreme Court, 51 MICH. L. REV. 141 (1952); Tribe, Separationof Powers
and Selective Judicial Deference, 3 SUPREME COURT TRENDS AND DEVELOPMENTS, 1980-81,
ALITY

(1948); H.

LASWELL,

POLICY SCIENCES

184 (1982); and Dames & Moore v. Regan, 453 U.S. 654 (1981).

9. This concept has been developed by the author elsewhere. See Baldwin, supra note 3.
10. 343 U.S. 579 (1952).
11. Id. at 587.
12. Id. at 599-600 (Frankfurter, J., concurring); see also 93 CONG. REC. 3637-045 (1974).
13. Id. at 662 (Clark, J., concurring).
14. Id. at 586-89.
15. See National Council of Community Mental Health Centers, Inc. v. Weinberger, 361
F. Supp. 897, 901 (D.D.C. 1973); see also National Treasury Employees Union v. Nixon, 492
F.2d 587, 604 (D.C. Cir. 1974).
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Court stated in Youngstown, "the President's power to see that the
laws are faithfully executed refutes the idea that he is to be a lawmaker. "16
Three criteria may be gleaned from United States v. Curtiss-Wright
Export Corp.: (1) the lack of an express constitutional commitment of
power to a coordinate branch or of an express prohibition of its exercise
by the President; (2) the historical and customary exercise of a power
by the Executive over a long period of time, coupled with tacit or
express congressional approval; and (3) the existence of a situation
17
that necessitates executive action in the public interest.
None of these criteria fit neatly into the international role of the
executive. The Supreme Court, therefore, created a fourth exception
when it recognized a distinction between inherent power in the realms
of foreign policy and domestic affairs. The Court concluded that inherent powers were much less restricted in the international arena. The
distinction between the President's domestic and foreign affairs powers'8 is only meaningful with the assumption that some activities are
regarded, for purposes of judicial intervention, as being too remote
from foreign affairs to permit presidential privilege. When inherent
power over foreign affairs issues is based upon expediency, the constitutional provision has been violated. In reality there is little constitutional control over the foreign affairs function of the United States
Chief Executive. The Court interprets the Constitution as recognizing
Congressional input regarding the enactment of laws impacting upon
foreign affairs. A recent case on point is Argentine Republic v.
Amerada Hess Shipping Corp.19
III.

JUDICIAL REVIEW AFTER CURTISS-WRIGHT

In Amerada Hess, Amerada Hess Shipping Corporation (Amerada
Hess) and United Carriers, Inc. (United), two Liberian corporations
sued the Argentine Republic in a United States district court for an
alleged tort in violation of the law of nations.- They sought to vest
jurisdiction in the district court under the Alien Tort Statute, admiralty, maritime jurisdiction, and universal jurisdiction for violations
of international law.21

16.
17.
18.

Youngstoum, 343 U.S. at 587.
United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304 (1936).
See, e.g., Dames & Moore v. Regan, 453 U.S. 654. See also L. HENKIN,

AFFAIRS AND THE CONSTITUTION

19.

488 U.S. 428 (1989).

20.

Id. at 431.

FOREIGN

173-76 (1972).

21. Id. at 432.
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United owned a crude oil tanker, the Hercules. The vessel was
time chartered to Amerada Hess in order to transport Alaskan crude
oil from Valdez, Alaska, to an oil refinery in the Virgin Islands.2
Since the Hercules was too wide to pass through the Panama Canal,
the ship sailed around Cape Horn at the southern tip of South
America.- After delivering the oil in the Virgin Islands, Amerada
Hess bought bunkers, the ship's fuel, and returned to Alaska.On April 2, 1981, the Argentine Republic invaded the Falkland
Islands, a crown colony of Great Britain off the eastern coast of Argentina.2 Throughout the war that ensued, Liberia remained a neutral
nation.27 However, the Hercules could not remain completely disengaged from the South Atlantic struggle.2 On May 5, while travelling
from Alaska to St. Croix, the ship's course was diverted to the Argentine navy's search for survivors of the General Belgado, an Argentine
navy cruiser sunk by a British submarine.2 When the rescue mission
was completed, the ship continued to St. Croix. °
On May 25, 1982, the Hercules, with a full load of bunkers, began
the return trip to Alaska.31 On June 3, the United States Maritime

Administration telexed both Great Britain and Argentina a list of
neutral United States flag vessels and United States interest Liberian
tankers (including the Hercules) that would be travelling through the
South Atlantic.32 On June 8, 1982, the Hercules was attacked and
bombed three times in the South Atlantic by aircraft of the Argentine
armed forces.3 As a result of these attacks, the Hercules headed for
the safe port of Rio de Janeiro, Brazil.- Since the attack left the
Hercules with an undetonated bomb that was too dangerous to remove

22. Id. at 431.
23. Id.
24. Id. See also 638 F. Supp. 73 (S.D.N.Y. 1986).
25. 488 U.S. at 428. Since 1977, the Hercules, as a foreign-flag vessel trading in domestic,
interstate United States Commerce, carried full cargoes of Alaskan crude oil from Alaska to
St. Croix, U.S. Virgin Islands. Id. All of the oil carried by the Hercules was ultimately consumed
in the continental United States or purchased by the U.S. government. Id.
26. The Falkland Islands are known in the Spanish-speaking world as the Islas Malvinas.
Amerada Hess, 638 F. Supp. at 73.
27. Id.
28. Id.
29. Id. at 73-4.
30. Id.
31. Id. at 74.
32. Amerada Hess Shipping Corp. v. Argintine Republic, 830 F.2d 421, 423 (2d Cir. 1987).
33. Amerada Hess, 638 F. Supp. at 74.
34. Id.
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in her side, United had the ship scuttled about 250 miles off the
Brazilian coast and sunk. 35
Respondents sought, but were unable, to retain Argentine lawyers
to pursue a claim for losses in Argentine courts. 3 Respondents attribute this failure to "the politically charged nature of the claim and
7
knowledge that the claim is opposed by the Argentine government."3
As a result, the respondents filed suit with the district court. Petitioner
sought to dismiss both claims pursuant to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 12(b) (1) and (2) for lack of subject matter jurisdiction and
personal jurisdiction on the grounds that the Foreign Sovereign Immunity Act of 1976 (FSIA) barred the respondents' action s
A.

Rulings of the Courts Below in Amerada Hess

The district court dismissed respondents' complaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. 39 The court held that the FSIA was the exclusive source of jurisdiction in suits against foreign states. 40 Pointing
to section 1604 of the FSIA, the court ruled that "[a] foreign state is
subject to jurisdiction in the courts of this nation if, and only if, an
FSIA exception empowers the court to hear the case.'41 After examining the relevant statutory exceptions to sovereign immunity from suit,
the court determined under the facts of the case that no exception
applied.- Therefore, the court held the Argentine Republic immune
43
from suit.
The court rejected respondents' contention that the Alien Tort
Statute of 1789 provided an independent source of jurisdiction in actions brought by an alien for tort only, in violation of the law of nations
or a treaty of the United States.- The court pointed out that the
Alien Tort Statute speaks in terms of plaintiffs and causes of actions,
and thus is silent as to defendants. 45 The court stated the FSIA does
not repeal the Alien Tort Statute; it merely narrows the class of
defendants. 46 The court also held the Alien Tort Statute did not create

35.
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.
46.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

at 73.
at 77.
at 75.

at 76.
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an implied exception to the FSIA. 47 Because of the insufficiency of
the evidence, the court rejected the respondents' argument that a
foreign sovereign state would not have enjoyed sovereign immunity
in 1789.48 Finally, the court held that universal jurisdiction did not
provide a basis for jurisdiction in a civil case since the doctrine provides
49
only for criminal jurisdiction.
The Second Circuit Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the
Alien Tort Statute did provide a jurisdictional grant that was not
preempted by the FSIA and that respondents stated a claim of a
violation of international law.5° In the majority's view, the Alien Tort
Statute contained a jurisdictional grant based on the "evolving standards of international law."'5' Furthermore, attacking a neutral ship in
international waters, without proper cause for suspicion or investigation, violates international law. 52 Looking to modern international law,
the majority noted "that foreign sovereigns are not immune from suit
for their violations of international law.53
After examining the legislative history of the FSIA, the majority
concluded that "Congress did not intend to remove existing remedies
in United States courts for violations of international law," since Congress' primary focus of the FSIA was "commercial concerns" and not
international law violations outside the commercial context. 4 Thus, in
the majority's view, "[s]ince Congress did not express a clear intent
to contradict the immunity rules of international law, and . . . left
the Alien Tort Statute in force," the FSIA did not preempt the Alien
Tort Statute.5
Addressing the issue of personal jurisdiction, the majority held
petitioner's actions had a sufficient nexus with the United States so

47. Id. at 76-77. The court pointed out that such an argument has already been rejected
by district courts, citing, Siderman v. Republic of Argentina, No. CV 82-1772-RMT (MCx) (C.D.
Cal., Mar. 7, 1985) (after a review of the legal history of foreign sovereign immunity, the court
concluded the Alien Tort Act did not provide an exemption to foreign sovereign immunity in a
case against Argentina for alleged torture and taking of property); In re Korean Air Lines
Disaster of Sept. 1, 1983, Misc. No. 83-0345 (D.D.C., Sept. 1, 1985) (Alien Tort Statute did
not provide an exception to the FSIA's requirements).
48. Amerada Hess, 638 F. Supp., at 76.
49. Id. at 77.
50. Amerada Hess, 830 F.2d at 422.
51. Id. at 425.
52. Id. at 424.
53. Id. at 425.
54. Id. at 426-27.
55. Id. at 427.
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as not to offend notions of fair play and substantial justice.5 Thus,
the court found no constitutional bar to the exercise of personal juris57
diction over petitioner.
Judge Kearse, in her dissent, stated that the majority disregarded
clear congressional intent "to deny United States courts jurisdiction
over such matters where . . . the foreign state asserts a defense of
sovereign immunity. "- Since federal subject matter jurisdiction is not
a matter of common law, but instead exists only to the extent bestowed
by Congress, Judge Kearse was skeptical of the majority's opinion
that the Alien Tort Statute allowed federal subject matter jurisdiction
to "ebb and flow with vicissitudes of evolving standards of international
law."-9
Judge Kearse contended that the clear restrictive provisions of the
FSIA could not be ignoredY° In her opinion, the FSIA was "intended
to preempt any other state or federal law (excluding applicable international agreements) for according immunity to foreign sovereigns. ' ' 61
Thus, according to the plain language of the FSIA and its legislative
history, the FSIA provided the exclusive framework within which
United States courts were to decide issues of foreign sovereign immunity.- After examining the substantive provisions of the FSIA, Judge
Kearse concluded that there was no basis to deny Argentina's
sovereign immunity claim.6
Judge Kearse's conclusions were adopted by the Supreme Court.6
The Court, speaking through Chief Justice Rehnquist, reaffirmed the
district court's conclusions and held that the Foreign Sovereign Immunity Act provides the exclusive means of obtaining jurisdiction over
an action against a foreign state in a United States Court.6 Upon
review of the legislation, the Court found no exception with the language of the statute that would allow the district court jurisdiction
over the Argentine Republic.-

56.
57.
58.
59.
60.
61.
CODE

62.
63.
64.

65.
66.

Id. at 428.
Id.
Id. at 429 (Kearse, J., dissenting).
Id.
Id.
Id. at 430, quoting H.R. Rep. No. 1487, 94th Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in 1976 U.S.
CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 6604, 6610.
Amerada Hess, 830 F.2d at 430.
Id.
Amerada Hess, 488 U.S. at 428.

Id. at 431.
Id. at 434-35.
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B.

The Legacy of Cary v. Curtis67

When judges are asked to embark on a lawmaking venture, they should carefully consider whether they, or a legislative body, are better equipped to perform the task at hand.
There are instances of so-called interstitial lawmaking that
inevitably become part of the judicial process. But when we
are asked to create an entirely new doctrine - to answer
questions of policy on which Congress has not spoken,68 we
have a special duty to identify the proper decisionmaker
before trying to make the proper decision.
When the novel question of policy involves a balancing
of the conflicting interests in the efficient operation of a
massive governmental program and the protection of the
rights of the individual - whether in the social welfare context, the civil service context, or the military procurement
context - I feel very deeply that we should defer to the
expertise of the Congress.69
Although this statement by Justice Stevens was not intended to
apply to the case at issue, it nevertheless could have been the Court's
conclusion in Amerada Hess.
As Justice Stevens' quote suggests, it is now a well-accepted doctrine of judicial review that legal norms impacting foreign affairs must
manifest themselves through democratically accepted principles. In
other words, it is the possibility of summoning the power of the government, not the Constitution, that ensures presidential observance
of the congressional version of the norm. Although the Constitution
under Article III grants juridical freedom, the Supreme Court has
historically refused to exercise that freedom, opting instead for the
illusion of freedom.
The illusion is strengthened by the general belief that the Court
has been, and continues to be, committed to the constitutional ideal

67. 44 U.S. (3 How.) 236, 245 (1845).
68. United States v. Gilman, 347 U.S. 507, 511 (1954).
69. Boyle v. United Technologies Corp., 487 U.S. 500, 530 (1988) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
Justice Brennan, in a lengthy and thoughtful dissent, echoed Justice Steven's observation:
Were I a legislator, I would probably vote against any law absolving multibillion
dollar private enterprises from answering for their tragic mistakes, at least if that
law were justified by no more than the unsupported speculation that their liability
might ultimately burden the United States Treasury. Some of my colleagues here
would evidently vote otherwise (as they have here), but that should not matter
here. We are judges not legislators, and the vote is not ours to cast.
Id. (Brennan, J., dissenting).
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of jus and lex. No matter how controversial the result, this is true
with respect to issues domestic in nature. The norm the Court attempts
to portray with respect to domestic constitutional issues has been both
moral and social. International matters are usually dealt with in a
nonjudicial context. To do otherwise, argues the Chief Justice, is to
ignore the conventional wisdom concerning the interpretation of Article III, which is that Article III courts do not make the laws that
govern the nation; the Article I Congress makes the laws. The Supreme Court interprets those laws and, except where the Constitution
commands otherwise, 7° the Court does not depart from that task.71
The Court, of course, can be activist, but only in the sense that
the Constitution permits. For example, the Bill of Rights places some
restraints upon government and it is of necessity the task of the Court
to ensure that those restraints are honored, not breached.7 2 The reason
for this dual judicial personality is that the fundamental values which

70.. Justice Brennan said it much better in his tribute to Judge J. Skelly Wright in Brennan,
In Memoriam: J. Skelly Wright, 102 HARV. L. REV. 361 (1981). See generally P. BOBBITr,
CONSTITUTIONAL FATE: THEORY OF THE CONSTITUTION

(1982); R.

NEELY,

How

COURTS

GOVERN AMERICA (1981); M. PERRY, THE CONSTITUTION, THE COURT AND HUMAN RIGHTS
(1982); Baldwin, The United States Supreme Court: A Creative Check or InstitutionalMisdirection?, 45 IND. L.J. 550 (1970).
In order to arrive at the level of 'qegal system" certain characteristics must exist: (1) allocation
of values; (2) authoritative nature of the allocation; (3) binding force of the allocation on society
as a whole; and (4) support by "legitimate physical compulsion." See J. STONE, SOCIAL DIMENSIONS OF LAW AND JUSTICE 744 (1966); see also Nagel, A ConceptionalScheme
Process, 7 AMER. BEHAVIOURAL SCIENTIST 7 (1963). To understand the focus,

Law as Process of Decision: A Policy-Oriented Approach to Legal Study, 1
FORM.

of the Judicial
see McDougal,

NATURAL

LAW

53 (1956).

71.

See generally, Nonet & Carlin, The Legal Profession, in 9 INTERNATIONAL ENCYC-

LOPEDIA OF THE SOCIAL SCIENCES
OF LAW

66 (D. Sills ed. 1986). See also L. FULLER,

THE MORALITY

(1964), and Hobbes, Leviathan chs. 13-14, Of the Natural Condition of Mankind as

Concerning Their Felicity and Misery in 3 THE

ENGLISH WORKS OF THOMAS HOBBES

110-17

(W. Holesworth ed. 1839).
72. As suggested in the text, the view that judges do and must rely on objective, legal
principles has been historically questioned and criticized. "The 'shining ... ideal of the rule of
law above men evolved solely from Reason' is partially fictional in nature." Miller & Howell,
The Myth of Neutrality in ConstitutionalAdjudication, 27 U. CHI. L. REV. 661, 663 (1960).
Similarly, Jerome Frank, advanced the position that the logical process of legal decisionmaking

is overstressed. J.

FRANK, LAW AND THE MODERN MIND

136-143 (1930). Rules, according to

Frank, are incidental: judges begin with the decision deemed desirable, and working backwards,
select such facts and apply such rules as will make the decision appear logical. J. FRANK,
COURTS ON TRIAL: MYTH AND REALITY IN AMERICAN JUSTICE 168 (1949). He emphasized
that law has a viable subjective component and that inevitably judges are influenced by social,
political, economic and moral prejudices. Id. In addition, emotion, intuition and feelings are
involved in the decisionmaking process. Id. at 173.
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the Bill of Rights purports to establish are a domestic legal order 73
through the vehicle of justice: suum cuique tribuere.74 Marbury v.
Madison75 teaches that the duty of the jurist is to preserve constitutional values. 76 To this lesson one must add the values to promote the
betterment of the human condition-7 and are reflected in constitutional

73. See, e.g., Ives v. Southern Buffalo Ry., 201 N.Y. 271 (1911). See also K. LLEWELLYN,
THE COMMON LAW TRADITION 3-4 (1960); Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361 (1989).
74. See debate about the role of the court in Graglia, Judicial Review on the Basis of
"Regime Principles":A Prescriptionfor Government By Judges, 26 S. TEX. L.J. 435 (1985).
75. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
76. I would submit that an essential element of formal constitutionalism is the limitation
of government powers. The limitation is established through a predetermined set of rules, those
rules being supreme over all that is outside the constitutional framework. An agency is conferred
with the power to insure the limits of government and to channel governmental interference
with individual liberties within predictable and well-established constitutional principles. It is,
therefore, the implied duty of the assigned agency to translate into effective and working reality
those predetermined principles of human kind which are established as a part of the orderly
process of constitutional government. If the Constitution is to endure without clutter, the various
agencies of constitutional government must assume a creative posture. I think it is safe to say
that the Court, in redefining the political question doctrine in Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186
(1962), also redefined its role in the political process. Prior to Baker the Court tended to keep
away from the internal working of the other branches of government. After Baker the Court
had begun a subtle move into the "political thicket." See Colegrove v. Green, 328 U.S. 549, 556
(1946). The bright line (if there ever was one) between representative democracy and the role
of the court had dulled considerably.
77. Few areas of human endeavor have caused this subtle conflict to be so sharply stated
as has the question of the non-judicial, governmental implementation of certain societal norms
which impact upon the moral behavior of the family unit. For many years the debate surrounding
the dilemma was neutralized; the Supreme Court sat as a spectator watching the drama unfold,
leaving the task of insuring or ignoring (yet to be discovered) fundamental rights within the
family unit to those agencies emerging from the political thicket. Mr. Justice Harlan dissenting
in Poe v. Uliman, 364 U.S. 497 (1961), took the first step toward substantive involvement in
the debate:
Certainly, Connecticut's judgment is no more demonstrably correct or incorrect
than are the varieties of judgment expressed in law on marriage and divorce, on
adult consensual homosexuality,, abortion, sterilization, euthanasia and suicide. If
we had a case before us which required us to decide simply, and in abstraction,
whether the moral judgment implicit in the application of the present statute to
married couples was a sound one, the very controversial nature of these questions
would, I think, require us to hesitate long before concluding that the Constitution
precluded Connecticut from choosing as it has among these various views. [But
we] are not presented simply with this moral judgment to be passed on as an
abstract proposition.
Id. at 547.
Harlan's dissent demonstrated the ideological struggle within the court. The struggle is
whether the court should involve itself substantively in the delivery of constitutional policies in
the specific area of privacy affecting the family unit, compare Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557
(1960) with United States v. Reidel, 402 U.S. 351 (1971), or should leave the task of developing
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goals of protecting persons against any outrage whatsoever, either
manifest or veiled.7 8
On matters impacting the domestic condition, the jurist is perceived
as an artisan of justice. 79 As an artisan of justice the jurist is also
seen as a constitutional agent of transformation. That which envisages
the constitutional consumer in full possession of his/her rights, provided
each is performing good, not evil. In the field of foreign affairs, the
jurist is a realist viewing the doctrine of separation of powers as
critical where the issues pertain to uncertainty and, at times, national
security. These goals of government are reflected, not in the Constitution, but in the very fact of nationhood.
The judiciary is not designed to serve the legislative role, nor is
it a creator of general international law.8° To preempt a government's
and implementing fifty different moral policies to the elected state representatives. See, e.g.,
Ely, The Wages of Crying Wolf: A Comment on Roe v. Wade, 82 YALE L.J. 920 (1973).
In Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965), the Court decided to examine critically the
concept of a constitutional right of privacy and its corresponding attendant obligations. Although
Griswold declared the Connecticut anticontraception statute to be unconstitutional in that it
was an invasion of privacy, the Court refused to determine the nature of the right of privacy
or its content. Griswold foretold Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973), which set off a new and
critical debate as to the role of the United States Supreme Court in delivering public policies.
The decision in Roe did not put the matter to rest; instead, it sharpened the focus of scholars
devoted to studying the workings of the court. See, e.g., A. Cox, THE ROLE OF THE SUPREME
COURT 113-14 (1976) and Tribe, Toward a Model of Roles in the Due Process Life and Law,
87 HARV. L. REV. 1, 27-29 (1973).
78. It is difficult to determine just what the Framers' goals were. Many have tried, however,
see e.g., F. McDONALD, WE THE PEOPLE: THE ECONOMIC ORIGINS OF THE CONSTITUTION
(1958); D. PRICE, AMERICA'S UNWRITTEN CONSTITUTION (1985); Hacker, Freedom and
Power, Common Men and Uncommon Men, in 4 NoMos, LIBERTY 308 (1962). See generally,
L. FULLER, supra note 71. But see City of Richmond v. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469 (1989).
79. See A. MILLER, TOWARD INCREASED JUDICIAL ACTIVISM (1982). This is not to
suggest that the judicial branch is the premier moral and social developer. It is to suggest that
the Constitution as interpreted defines a nontrivial role for the court. See also Bork, Styles in
Constitutional Theory, 26 S. TEx L.J. 383 (1985); Monaghan, Our Perfect Constitution, 56
N.Y.U. L. REV. 359 (1981); Grano, JudicialReview and A Written Constitutionin a Democratic
Society, 28 WAYNE L. REV. 1 (1981). Saphire, The Search for Legitimacy in Constitutional
Theory: What Price Purity?, 42 OHIO ST. L.J. 335 (1981); Saphire, ProfessorRichards' Unwritten Constitution of Human Rights: Some Preliminary Observations, 4 U. DAYTON L. REV.

305 (1979); Richards, Human Rights as the Unwritten Constitution: The Problem of Change
and Stability in ConstitutionalInterpretation,4 U. DAYTON L. REV. (1979); Parker, The Past
of ConstitutionalTheory - and Its Future 42 OHIo ST. L.J. 223 (1983). For related ideas, see
C. BLACK, DECISION ACCORDING TO LAW (1983); Grey, Do We Have an Unwritten Constitution?, 27 STAN. L. REV. 703 (1975); Grey, Origins of the Unwritten Constitution:Fundamental
Law in American Revolutionary Thought, 30 STAN. L. REV. 843 (1978); Fiss, The Supreme
Court, 1978 Term - Foreword: The Forms of Justice, 93 HARV. L. REV. 1 (1979); Murphy,
An Ordering of Constitutional Values, 53 S. CAL. L. REV. 703 (1980).
80. See, e.g., United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304 (1936).
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laws, the judiciary must first recognize an actual and predesigned
federal-state conflict or government-humankind disruption. Having
done so, the federal jurist can only then implicate either the common
or statutory constitutional law. If, however, the preemption does not
involve matters uniquely federal or in conflict with state law or human
condition, then the judiciary will stay its hand. 81 To do otherwise,
argues the Court in Amerada Hess, is to ignore Congressional duty
and Executive vision. It is the duty of Congress, not the Court nor
the President, to restrict. It is the function of the Court to insure
that such restriction is in conformity with the law of the land.
In Amerada Hess, this principal concern of the Court was reaffirmed. Interpreting the Alien Tort Act and Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act as being consistent with each other protected the Court
from the charge of federal courts becoming small international courts
of justice.
Therefore, within the context of present judicial review jurisprudence, the district court, in Amerada Hess, properly granted Argentina's motion to dismiss upon a finding that the court lacked the requisite jurisdiction to hear the case. The Court of Appeals incorrectly
held that jurisdiction existed. The Court of Appeals was prepared to
venture beyond domestic limitations upon judicial review whereas the
United States Supreme Court looked to the chosen representatives of
the people for answers to international implementation.
IV.

THE EXECUTIVE AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

A.

The Nation -

The People

For the most part, citizens of the United States are not accustomed
to thinking of themselves as part of the world economy because for
much of the nation's history the United States could afford to be
parochial. Foreign trade has involved less of gross national product
than it does elsewhere. In a land of enormous size and seemingly
limitless natural resources, the nation could believe in isolation and
self-reliance. More importantly, elected representatives practiced it.
The frontier was not only a laboratory for developing native customs
and institutions; it provided a natural safety valve for internal pressures. Problems of adjustment could be solved by internal growth.
Whatever economic problems remained could be resolved, so it was
suggested, by a system of law that was reflected in a time honored
constitution.

81.

Amerada Hess, 488 U.S. at 442.
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Alexis de Tocqueville, while visiting the United States as a French
observer in 1835, wrote that America's legal profession already constituted its "aristocracy."- He noted that the language and spirit of the
law permeated American culture. "[O]ne must not forget," he wrote
of lawyers, "that although they value liberty, they generally rate
legality as far more precious; they are less afraid of tyranny than of
arbitrary power. '' The people retain a confidence in law as a check on institutional
misdirection.- They tend to cling to legal processes - with all their
transparency and neutrality - as ultimate arbiters in the determination of public policy. Sometimes, in an excess of division, legal procedures are created precisely to permit politicians to avoid taking responsibility for making difficult choices. This tendency casts the concept
of accountability onto the courts and ultimately onto the Constitution.
In international matters, accountability lies elsewhere. The Trade
Agreement Acts of 19795 and decisions of the Court of International
Trade demonstrate a long-standing faith in the judiciary's ability to
read legislation.
As the Court reaffirmed in Amerada Hess, most of the power to
the federal government relating to foreign affairs appear in the enumeration of executive powers:86 the President is the "Commander-inChief' of the armed forces; 87 he is given the power, with the approval
of two-thirds of the Senate, "to make Treaties";- and with the "advice
and consent" of the Senate, he "shall appoint Ambassadors, other
public Ministers and Consuls. '"- Also, "he shall receive Ambassadors
and other public Ministers. '" Those constitutional provisions are said
to be the scope of "the executive power" to conduct the nation's foreign
affairs.9l

82. DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 245 (J.P. Mayer & M. Lerner eds. 1966).
83. Id. at 244.
84. See Baldwin, supra note 70.
85. Trade Agreements Act of 1979, Pub. L. No. 96-39, 93 STAT. 144 (codified as amended
in 19 U.S.C. §§ 5, 13 (1982)).
86. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1.
87. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl.1.
88. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 1, cl.2.
89. Id.
90. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3.
91. The Constitution only once refers to the law of nations. U.S. CONST. art I, § 8. Yet
the issue was very much on the minds of the Framers. See THE FEDERALIST No. 3 (J. Jay)

and

THE FEDERALIST

No. 82 (A. Hamilton).
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In United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp.,2 the Supreme
Court ruled that the President was the nation's representative in
foreign affairs.9 Curtiss-Wright concerned the validity of a delegation
of power from Congress to the PresidentY4 In the course of upholding
the delegation of power, the Court noted that the legislative power
was combined with
the very delicate, plenary and exclusive power of the President as the sole organ of the federal government in the field
of international relations - a power which does not require
as a basis for its exercise an act of Congress, but which, of
course, like every other governmental power, must be exercised in subordination to the applicable provisions of the
Constitution. It is quite apparent that if, in the maintenance
of our international relation, embarrassment - perhaps serious embarrassment - is to be avoided and success for our
aims achieved, congressional legislation which is to be made
effective through negotiation and inquiry within the international field must often accord to the President a degree of
discretion and freedom from statutory restriction which
would not be admissible were domestic affairs alone involved.
Moreover, he, not Congress has the better opportunity of
knowing the conditions which prevail in foreign countries,
and especially is this true in time of war. He has his confidential sources of information. He has his agents in the form
of diplomatic, consular and other officials. Secrecy in respect
of information gathered by them may be highly necessary,
and the premature disclosure of it productive of harmful
results. Indeed, so clearly is this true that the first President
refused to accede to a request to lay before the House of
Representatives the instructions, correspondence and documents relating to the negotiation of the Jay Treaty - a
refusal the wisdom of which was recognized by the House
itself and has never since been doubted.9 5
This expansive power has been evident since the first President;
it was not constitutionalized until 1936.9
92. 299 U.S. 304 (1936).
93. The Court distinguished the President's power in the realms of foreign policy and
domestic affairs. Id. at 321. The latter is subject to greater restriction because it is extensively
dealt with by the Constitution. Id.
94. Id. at 304. A joint resolution of Congress giving the President the power to prohibit
the sale of arms to South American countries if he found such a prohibition Would promote the
re-establishment of regional peace was attacked as unconstitutional. Id.
95. Id. at 320.
96. Id. at 320-321.

Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 1990

17

INTERNATIONAL
JOURNAL
Florida JournalFLORIDA
of International
Law, Vol.LAW
5, Iss.
2 [1990], Art. 1

B.

[Vol. 5

InternationalAgreements: A Judicially Approved Method
of Circumventing Constitutional Requirements for
Senate Input Into Treaties

The power to override state law and policy through the use of
international agreements is also a part of the powers of the President.
Two early Supreme Court cases, United States v. Belmont- and
United States v. Pink,9 involved the power of the President to consummate international agreements without going through the process of
having formal treaties ratified by the Senate and the effect of such
agreements on state law.- These cases raised a separate issue which
has proven controversial - the extent to which executive agreements
can be employed to circumvent the role of the Senate embodied in
Article II of the Constitution.100
This dispute does not concern the propriety of the bulk of agreements made between the heads of government in their day-to-day
handling of routine arrangements. The exchange of visits by naval
vessels and military arrangements, like the line in conquered territory
where allied armies will meet, are examples of such routine arrangements. Such arrangements may fall within the independent power of
the President as "Commander-in-Chief," other arrangements are considered within "the executive power" of the President to conduct day-today business of foreign relations. One of the questions stirred by
Belmont and Pink is whether the President might use executive agreements for basic long-range commitments of the nation - possibly
because of the fear it might be impossible to obtain the two-thirds
vote of the Senate which the Constitution requires for treaty ratifica-

97. 301 U.S. 324 (1937).
98. 315 U.S. 203 (1942).
99. Both cases involved a dispute over the title to assets of a Russian insurance company
following its nationalization by the new Russian government. In 1933, an executive agreement
was made in which the Soviet Union assigned its vested rights in these assets to the U.S.

Government. Id. at 234. Under this agreement, the rights of the United States were superior
to the claims of the corporation and foreign creditors. Id. The Court held that the agreement
was an international compact that did not require Senate approval. Id. at 229. Yet the agreement
was accorded the same authority as a treaty. "A treaty is a 'Law of the Land' under the
supremacy clause . . . of the Constitution. [linternational compacts and agreements . . . have
a similar dignity." Id. at 230.
100. See Riesenfeld, The Power of Congress and the President in InternationalRelations,
25 CAL. L. REV. 643, 674 (1937); Matthews, The Constitutional Power of the President to
Conclude InternationalAgreements, 64 YALE L.J. 345, 370 (1955).
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tion.101 However, even where an international agreement might interfere with this constitutional guarantee, courts still tend to favor the
President, recognizing the validity of the agreenent.'°2
V.

ADMINISTRATION POLICY: 1980-PRESENT

For some fifty years the United States-Soviet relationship has
dominated United States foreign policy. It was not until the end of
President Reagan's tenure in office that frigid relations with the Soviet
Union began to thaw. 1°3 Contributing to the Reagan Administration's
early reluctance to pursue arms control negotiations was the difficulty
of verifying the Soviet Union's compliance with the terms of an agreement. The Soviet Union's willingness to entertain meaningful verification procedures has seriously impaired the Administration's recalcitrant position."°4
Dramatic improvement in superpower relations resulted when
President Reagan and Soviet leader Gorbachev signed the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Force (INF) Treaty. °s While this treaty is
the first to make real cuts in superpower nuclear arsenals,- ° it has
limited military value.107 The real significance of the INF pact lies in
its impact on future superpower relations.1- Following the signing of
the Treaty, both superpowers communicated their willingness to
negotiate a much more drastic agreement possibly cutting their long

U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2.
102. Dames & Moore v. Regan, 453 U.S. 654 (1981).
103. Undoubtedly, Gorbachev's accession as chief of the Soviet Communist Party in 1985
significantly contributed to this effect.
104. The INF Treaty provides for inspectors to visit each other's countries and witness
the destruction of missiles. Intermediate-Range Nuclear Force Treaty, infra note 105, art. XI.
105. Treaty on the Elimination of Intermediate-Range and Shorter-Range Missles, Dec. 8,
1987, United States-Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, 27 I.L.M. 90. The text of the Treaty
appears in Dept. of State Bulletin, Feb. 1988, at 22. On December 8, 1987, at their third summit,
the two leaders agreed to ban all Intermediate-range Nuclear Forces (INF) missiles with ranges
from 300-3,400 miles (500-5,500 kIn). Id. See also The Washington Summit; The Arsenals That
Will Remain L.A. Times, Dec. 9, 1987, at 24, col. 2; U.P.I., June 8, 1988.
106. The treaty involved the elimination of 2,800 deployed and stockpiled missiles including
some 3,800 warheads, the majority of which are positioned in Europe. See, e.g., BBC, Dec. 18,
1987; Reuters, Dec. 9, 1987; Reuters, Dec. 8, 1987.
107. It is apparent that the West will still possess over 4,000 other nuclear weapons in
Europe. Reuters, Dec. 8, 1987. Additionally, in total, the treaty involves the reduction of only
4 percent of the superpowers' total nuclear arsenals. Reuters, Dec. 9. 1987.
108. Jonathan Dean, a former U.S. negotiator on conventional arms in Europe, stated that
the signing of the INF Treaty could be "look[ed] back on as the big turning point in the cold
war, the builddown in the cold war." Worsnip, Importance of INF Treaty Outweighs its Military
Value, Reuters, Dec. 8, 1987.
101.
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range strategic nuclear arsenal in half. It is clear that as this relationship continues to improve, American policy makers will be, paying
greater attention to Eastern Europe.
The present administration is trying to gain congressional approval
of two new arms control treaties likely to be agreed to sometime this
year: the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START) and the Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE) agreement. 1°9 However, recent developments could seriously hinder these efforts. The liberated East German press reported that 24 Soviet SS-23 missiles- ° had been transferred to their country. Further inquiries with the Soviet Union and
other Eastern European governments indicate that SS-24 missiles had
also been transferred to Bulgaria and Czechoslovakia.- At present it
is unclear whether the missiles were transferred before or after signing
of the INF treaty. If it is determined that the transfer violated the
treaty, members of Congress who opposed the INF accord will have
12
powerful ammunition to oppose START and CFE.
While the Reagan Administration refrained from talking with the
Soviet Union about Eastern Europe, current events in that region
coupled with U.S. improved relations with the Soviets guarantee President Bush's active attention. The Reagan Administration's objective
of increasing U.S. ties to the governments and people of Eastern
Europe will be continued.
The Bush Administration has maintained its predecessor's policy
of dealing with Eastern Europe at a high diplomatic level. Reagan's
Deputy Secretary of State, John C. Whitehead, had personally involved himself with Eastern Europe, having made some six trips
there.1 3 Whitehead had made clear to representatives of Central
Europe that the United States would quickly respond to progress
made in their countries. 1 4 Deputy Secretary of State Lawrence Eag-

109. Reuters, Mar. 29, 1990.
110. The SS-23 missiles has an estimated range of about 310 miles and thus falls within
the coverage of the INF Treaty. L.A. Times, Apr. 15, 1990, at 7, col. 1.
111. Id.
112. Incidents like this indicate problems with verification, a major concern in the INF
negotiations. Id.
113. Whitehead's involvement has included numerous meetings with the leaders of Poland,
Rumania, Hungary, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia, West Germany, East Germany and
Brussels. See, e.g., Wash. Post, Dec. 23, 1989, at All. Foremost in his discussions with these
leaders are the issues of improving human rights, political liberalization, and economic reform. Id.
114. When asked at a news conference what role the West would play in helping reforms,
Whitehead stated that the two keys were trade and investment. See, e.g., Wash. Post, Oct.
28, 1988, at A28. He stressed that as policies loosened, U.S. firms would, for example, begin
buying and selling in the Soviet Union. Id.
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leburger recently returned from a trip to Hungary, Poland, Austria,
and Yugoslavia. It would appear that these incentives from the West
are motivating sudden and extreme changes."1
Until recently communist governments subservient to Soviet interests dominated Eastern Europe.1 6 The alliance system created by
the Warsaw Pact and the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance
(CMEA) precluded normal ties between Eastern Europe and the
West. 1 7 But as of this writing the 45 year-old system appears to have
crumbled., The Solidarity-led government of Poland has been joined
by a non-communist government in Czechoslovakia, led by President
Havel." 9 On March 25, 1990, Hungary engaged in what was hailed as
free parliamentary elections.-m And in East Germany, Romania, and
Bulgaria, communist parties ousted their leadership and agreed to
have multiparty elections in the near future.12 1 Communism as the
preeminent political force in Eastern Europe appears to be experiencing unprecedented change.'2
The Reagan Administration, in the face of strong objections by
Secretary of State George P. Schultz, had resisted putting the "thawing economic relationship versus national security" issue on the United
States-Soviet agenda, despite efforts by senior officials at State and
on the National Security Council (NSC) staff to put it on the table.'2
Perhaps the reason for resisting the national security agenda item
is that
[for the first time in a quarter of a century, the impetus
for change in Eastern Europe is emanating [from] the Soviet
Union, not from Eastern Europe itself. .. . - The United

115. For example, in June, 1988, Yugoslav Prime Minister Branko Mikulic advanced a
package of economic measures aimed at reviving the country's crippled economy. U.S. Backs
Yugoslav Economic Plan, L.A. Times, June 6, 1988, at 19, col. 1 (from Reuters, June 7, 1988).
Deputy Secretary Whitehead described these policies as a dramatic moment in Yugoslav history.
Id. However, enormous sums of financial assistance are required if these changes are to succeed.
116. Speech given by Deputy Secretary of State Eagleburger before the House Foreign
Affairs Committee, FED. NEWS SERV., Mar. 7, 1990.
117. Id.
118. Id.
119. Id.

120.

Id.

121.
122.
123.

Id.
Id.
Madison, Eye on the East. NAT'L J., Nov. 5, 1988, at 2772.

124.

Id.
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States and its European allies should focus actively on an
effort to forge a more stable relationship with Eastern
Europe.'15
Secretary of State, James A. Baker has been a strong backer of
both the International Finance Corporation and the World Bank which
is at present headed by former Congressman Barber Conable. 12 The
World Bank has pledged long term support to Poland in response to
the Solidarity-led government's economic program.- Two loan agreements totalling 360 million dollars were signed on February 22, 1990.128
Barber Conable stated that the loans "will be the opening part of an
extended program which can last as long as this courageous course is
continued."'- Future World Bank support depended on the government's adherence to its plan for a free market economy, pointed out
Conable.' 3o
While Poland's immediate future will certainly entail severely depressed economic conditions, 131 it is optimistic to note that the Polish
people are strongly supportive of attempts at restructuring their economy. 132 In response to this crisis, other institutions have come forward
with additional support. The International Monetary Fund (IMF) has
approved a standby loan of $723 million.- 3 Barber Conable has promised to commit $5 billion to Eastern Europe over the next 5 years. 134

125. Id. (quoting Zbigniew Brzezinski, formerly President Carter's National Security Adviser).
126. Farnsworth, World Bank May Give FirstLoan to Poland, N.Y. Times, Nov. 10, 1988,
at D2, col. 5. The International Finance Corporation is part of the World Bank, which provided
almost 20 billion dollars to developing countries in 1987. Id.
127. Unemployment Doubles in Poland But World Bank Pledges Help, Reuter, Feb. 21,
1990. The two investment loans Poland will receive from the World Bank are the first since
Poland joined in 1986. Id.
128. Id.
129. Id. This remark was made to reporters following talks with Polish Finance Minister
Leszek Balcerowicz the day before the loan agreement was signed. Id.
130. Id.
131. Between January 1990 and February 1990, unemployment doubled with figures souring
from 55,800 to 107,009. The Polish government expects 400,000 unemployed by the end of the
year and some experts predict unemployment in the millions. Id.
132. Conable stated, "I find the mood in this country strongly supportive at this point and
am encouraged by the courage the Polish people are showing in trying to restructure their
economy so that there can be a better quality of life in the future." Id.
133. Id.
134. Chi. Trib., Feb. 23, 1990, at C1. Eastern European Countries and Western investors
see Poland as a testing ground for economic reform.
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Clearly, international financial institutions such as the IMF and the
World Bank can provide important assistance in integrating East European Countries into the world economic community. 135
VI.

PROGRAM NOT WITHOUT CRITICS

The Reagan Administration was criticized in Congress and among
labor leaders in the United States. In 1988, the House considered a
bill to reauthorize the Overseas Private Investment Corporation
(OPIC), an agency that offers insurancem to the United States companies investing in "high-risk" countries.137 Labor unions and conservatives joined to defeat extension of OPIC insurance coverage to investment in Hungary.13
Interestingly, it was a Bush Aide who first spoke to the disarray
within the Reagan Administration with respect to working with the
Congress. Then-Deputy Secretary Whitehead responded that the next
Administration will have an opportunity to reestablish in Congress
the executive's wishes with respect to selected Central and Eastern
European countries, and that Congress will, for example, be asked to
act to make Hungary eligible for OPIC insurance. Indeed, in June
1989, the House of Representatives Ways and Means trade subcommittee approved two bills authorizing the OPIC to grant risk insurance
for United States business investments in Hungary and Poland. The
first involved risk insurance plus duty-free treatment for selected
Polish imports. The second added risk insurance for trade with Hungary. In October 1989, Hungary and Poland signed agreements with
the United States.139
In view of these recent successes in Hungary and Poland, OPIC
is at this writing attempting to gain authorization to do business in
East Germany and Czechoslovakia.- 4 But the legislation providing
authorization to OPIC is a slow process and as a result United States

135. At this writing, Bulgaria will soon apply to join the IMF and the World Bank in an
effort to deal with its enormous debt. Bulgariato Seek IMF Membership, Reuters, Feb. 16, 1990.
136. OPIC insures investors against losses due to insurrection, nationalization and currency
inconvertibility. Investment Agency Poised for Major Eastern Europe Effort, Reuters, Mar.
28, 1990 [hereinafter Investment Agency].

137. Madison, supra note 123.
138. Id.
139. Investment Agency, supra note 136. In January, 1990, OPIC issued its first insurance
contract in Hungary. Id. This contract covered General Electric Company's $150 million investment to acquire a majority interest in light bulb producer Tungsram. Id. GE made clear that
OPIC insurance was necessary for the venture to have succeeded. Id.
140. Id. The lifting of the Iron Curtain has greatly expanded the role of OPIC by adding
Eastern Europe to its traditional role in Asia, Africa, and Latin America. Id.
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businesses are slow to move into these new markets. 141 If the United
States is to be viewed as a serious investment partner in these countries, it is absolutely necessary that OPIC programs must be approved
in an expedient manner.
VII.

POSSIBLE DIRECTIONS OF THE BUSH ADMINISTRATION

At this point in history one could suggest that the United States,
Europe and Japan risk being pulled apart by three super regional
blocks of economic self-interest groups now forming or being formalized
in the American Hemisphere, in Western Europe and East Asia. The
results could be disastrous considering that Congress is crying for a
more protectionist economy in the United States and is threatening
further protectionist legislation.
The landmark free-trade agreement between Washington and Ottawa142 could lead to the integration of energy, automobile, banking,

transportation and other industries on an unprecedented scale. - It
could be the nucleus of a North American common market. 144 Already,
tax and tariff breaks for trade and investment are in place for the
Caribbean Basin and Central America.145

An agreement similar to that between the United States and
Canada is currently being negotiated between the United States and
147
Mexico. 1- A $3.5 billion loan to Mexico in October 1988, was a start.
Then a year later, President Bush took a small step toward a free-trade
pact, signing a broad trade and investment accord with Mexican President Carlos Salinas de Gartari. 4 8 Following from this agreement,
lower tariffs for key industrial sectors are being negotiated. But a
free trade agreement with Mexico is likely to take years to negotiate
141. Id.
142. Free Trade Agreement, Jan. 2, 1988, United States Canada, 27 I.L.M. 293 (1988).
143. Id. This agreement went into effect January 1, 1989 and is designed to eliminate tariffs
and other trade barriers between the two countries within 10 years. Reagan Puts U.S. Canada
Free Trade Pact Into Effect, Reuters, Dec. 31, 1988.
144. This is a concept developed by the Supreme Court in Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. 1
(1824).
145. The Emerging Trade Threat, N.Y. Times, Oct. 24, 1988, at A17, col. 1 [hereinafter
Trade Threat].
146. U.S., Mexico Discuss Free Trade Pact, Wash. Times, Mar. 28, 1990, at C1 [hereinafter
Free Trade Pact]. Mexico is the United States' fourth largest trading partner after Canada,
the European Community and Japan. Id. Bilateral trade between the U.S. and Mexico has
increased since Mexico joined the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), the multilateral body that sets rules for international trade, in 1986. U.P.I., Mar. 27, 1990.
147. Trade Threat, supra note 145.
148. Mexico Leader Calls War on Poverty His Biggest Challenge, Reuters, Jan. 7, 1991.
President Salinas is a Harvard educated political economist. Id.

https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/fjil/vol5/iss2/1

24

Baldwin: The Bush Administration
East-West Trade: Some Observations
TRADE
EAST-WESTand

and require overcoming serious problems. Whereas Canadian companies are capable of immediately competing against United States
companies, the same is not true with Mexico. 149 As a result of the
wide disparity between the U.S. and Mexican economies, any agreement that might be reached may require the U.S. to make special

concessions. 150
The most visible regional block is the European Economic Community (EEC). 151 Although an economic union for Europe has been more
talk than action for decades, 152 the goal of achieving a true single
market by 1992 has become a top priority.' 3 In contrast to the goal
of a full economic union proclaimed in the 1970's but never reached,- 5"
the EEC has been making significant strides toward completion of its
single market program. Presently, ninety percent'5 of the program
149. Canadian Prime Minister Brian Mulroney has expressed his concern that forming a
regional common market might be politically dangerous for Mexico. Mulroney Urges Caution
on North American Common Market, Reuters, Mar. 17, 1990.
150. Robert Herzstein, head of the Washington Office of the law firm Sherman & Sterling,
reportedly stated that, "There would have to be much more careful attention given to transitional
measures, there might even be a need for special concession by the U.S." See Free Trade Pact,
supra note 108.
151. The European Community was created in 1957 with the goal of establishing a common
market. See Treaty Establishing the European Economic Community, Mar. 25, 1957, 298
U.N.T.S. 11. Initially, it was limited to six adjoining countries: France, West Germany, Italy,
Holland, Belgium and Luxembourg. Hoffman, The European Community and 1992, 68 FOREIGN
AFFAIRS 27, 32 (1989). These members chose economic means to reach political objectives. Id.
However, their enterprise was limited to agriculture and the removal of tariffs and quotas on
trade. Id. Today, the Community has twelve members: the initial six plus Portugal, Greece,
Spain, Ireland, Britain, and Denmark. Trying to Keep the EC Together, Fin. Times, May 17,
1989, at 117.
152. In 1985 the European Council made public its goal of forming a single market by 1992.
Hoffman, supra note 151, at 27. This disclosure seemed of slight significance to many who
believed that the EC's goal of forming a common market had been achieved because tariffs
within the Community had been abolished, a common external tariff enacted, and a common
agricultural policy instituted. Id.
153. In its efforts to tear down trade barriers and abolish custom formalities among the
12 European countries, a mammoth market of 320 million people with an annual output exceeding
$4 trillion is being created.
154. Europe has constantly "remained a maze of border controls, government subsidies to
national industries, closed national systems of procurement in military and other key public
sectors, and national regulation of industrial standards, copyrights, transportation, banking,
insurance and health requirements for the entry of goods." Id. It is likely that border patrols
will remain in force in Great Britain after 1992. EC Unity Urged to Help Counter Upheaval
in Eastern Europe, Reuters, Dec. 17, 1989.
155. Europe 1992: The U.S. Role in a United Europe; Conference on Issues Affecting the
Future of US/EC Relationships, FED. NEWS SERV., Feb. 23, 1990. These statistics were
presented by Roger Wallace, Deputy Undersecretary for the International Trade Administration
at the U.S. Department of Commerce. Id.
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has been proposed and 152 of the 279 directives needed to complete
the program have been adopted by the EEC.15
The United States has always been a strong supporter of European
integration. 157 Now with the prospect of a single market imminent,
the Bush administration must endeavor to support this process. At
the same time it must ensure that it not result in the closing of
European markets to America. United States Trade Representative
Carla Hills has been meeting monthly with Frans Andreissen, VicePresident of the European Community (EC). 15 The EC is prone to
propose rules that unfairly disadvantage the United States.' 59 And
while the EC has demonstrated its receptiveness to United States
concerns, it is nonetheless clear that as 1992 approaches, a single
market poses a threat to unrestricted free trade between the United
States and the EEC.16°
While a single European market may potentially have adverse
consequences on U.S. trade with the EEC, the possibility exists for
improved trade relations as well.161 The Bush Administration's major
concern is that the program is run in an open manner. 1c The United
States' concern is that as 1992 approaches, EC companies will be
subject to greater competitive pressures resulting in the implementation of protectionist policies.- These policies will force United States
firms to invest in manufacturing facilities in the EC, not so much
because they are wise business opportunities, but to insure inclusion
in the lucrative single market.

156. For example, these areas for action include: (1) the replacement of the hundred-odd
forms required of the members' citizens at European borders with a single administrative
document; (2) a measure that will permit engineers and doctors to settle anywhere in the
Community without first having to pass a local exam; and, (3) a directive that allows a bank,
licensed in its home country to operate throughout the Community. Hoffman, supra note 151,
at 27.
157. 1992-Redrauing the Map of Europe; Tokyo "Bridge" to Brussels, Fin. Times, July 2,
1990.
158. On February 23, 1990, Representative Hills spoke at the "Europe 1992: The U.S. Role
of a United Europe" conference in Washington, D.C. FED. NEWS SERV., Feb. 23, 1990.
159. Last year, protectionist measures regarding banking, trucking, broadcasting and
mergers proposed by the EC were challenged by the U.S. and all but one was rejected by the
EC. The EC adopted a proposal that discriminates against U.S. and other foreign firms. Id.
160. Commerce and Trade, FED. NEWS SERV., Feb. 23, 1990.
161. In 1989, U.S. exports to the EC reached a record $87 billion with the U.S. having a
positive trade balance of $1.7 billion. Just two years ago, the U.S. sustained a $22 billion deficit.
Europe 1992 Means One $4.6 Trillon Consumer Market, BALT. Bus. J., Aug. 13, 1990, § 1, at 22.
162. Id.
163. Id.
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Particularly worrisome is the fear that EC regulations will discriminate against businesses that do not use European Community components, manufacturing plants or technologies. Additionally, there is
concern that even EC regulation of non-U.S. products may affect
United States' products. For example, in their concern for limiting
the importation of Japanese cars,1 64 the EC might determine that
Japanese cars manufactured in the United States are to be considered
Japanese. If this were to happen, both the principle and reality of
free and open trade and investment in the United States would be
indirectly threatened. In response to this type of EC policy, the
Japanese would understandably curtail its investing in the United
States, resulting in a loss of production, jobs, and exports. Without
being able to engage in trade with a global economy, it would be
senseless to invest in the United States.
It is essential that American firms have the right to establish in
the EC the right of national treatment within the community in all
its commercial activities. Ensuring this status must be a priority for
the Bush Administration. The Bush Administration must be assured
that the investment environment will be shaped by market forces and
not by local industrial development. In order to ensure a partnership
that supports world trade, competitive investment and trade in the
single market must be based on commercial factors, not regulated
preferences. In furthering this end, the United States must avoid
trade practices that suggest protectionist motives. 165
The size of the European Bloc may well exceed that of its current
twelve country membership. As Eastern and Central European countries are freeing themselves of their communist past, the European
Community is considering including them in a continent-wide free
67
trading zone. 1 6 This decision will be made in the very near future.1

164. Currently, 4 of the 12 EC members restrict Japanese car imports. France, Spain and
Italy limit Japanese cars to 2% or 3% and Great Britain restricts them to 10% of its market.
Japan Imports Test of Patriotism in Europe, Chi. Trib., Mar. 18, 1990, at C3.
165. The F.D.A. has stopped the import of some French and Italian wines after finding
procymidone, a Japanese-made fungicide, in consignments. Wine Bar Could Be Start of Trade
War, Daily Telegraph, Apr. 3, 1990, at 11. However legitimate this concern is, it has aroused
suspicion among European governments that protectionist pressure from Congress is responsible.
Id. Some believe that this could be the start of a trade war. Id.
166. This arrangement would not result in these countries acquiring full membership in the
EC. EC Seeks to Improve Ties with East Europe; Continent-Wide Free-TradeZone May Be
Good, Wash. Post, Feb. 24, 1990, at A12 [hereinafter Improve Ties]. In a recent speech by EC
foreign minister, Frans H.J.J. Andriessen, he stated that the arrangement would "anchor these
new Eastern democracies to the free world." Id. At the very least, the closer links would allow
Eastern European manufactured goods duty-free access to the richer markets of Western
Europe. Id.
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It is even possible that the Soviet Union might be included. 1 Before
being granted admission into the larger market, however, the Central
and Eastern European countries will be required to form democratic
governments, free-market economies, and offer reciprocal free-trade
privileges to EC members.169 Should this plan become a reality, the
largest trading bloc in the world would emerge with the free trade
area comprising an estimated 742 million people.17
Such an enormous bloc could prove to be an even greater threat
to the United States. As the European region becomes more closely
united, its members may become less fearful of engaging in discrimination against American companies. 171 While the Bush Administration
needs to monitor these developments in order to ensure favorable
treatment for the United States, there is no doubt that such a union
could also prove enormously beneficial to the United States. American
companies as well as those from Japan, and the EC will be able to
take advantage of low wage rates and an educated labor force to build
manufacturing plants in Eastern Europe and export products to the
West. 172
173
As the prospect of a unified Germany has in fact become a reality,
there is concern among the EEC over relevant pragmatic considerations. In addition to the increased political and military might of a
single Germany, the cost of reunification will be enormous.174 Britain
has made clear that Germany must bear the financial burden of reunification before it can play a full part in the European Single Market.-

The EEC Executive Commission recently concluded a new trade and economic cooperation
agreement with Bulgaria. EEC, Bulgaria Sign 10-Year Trade Cooperation, Cent. News Agency,
Apr. 5, 1990. This agreement will endure for 10 years and is designed to "ease EEC import
restrictions on manufactured products from Bulgaria and to promote market economy in Bulgaria." Id. The EEC has signed similar agreements with Poland, Hungary, the Soviet Union,
Czechoslovakia, and East Germany. Negotiations with Romania are scheduled to begin soon. Id.
167. Id.
168. Id.
169. Improve Ties, supra note 166. (Statement by Frans Andriessen).
170. Among the countries possibly included in the new bloc are: Czechoslovakia, Poland,
Hungary, Romania, and Bulgaria. Id.
171. Frans Andriessen has attempted to assure U.S. officials and business executives that
the move to unite the whole of Europe would not lead to discrimination against American
companies. See Improve Ties, supra note 166.
172. See, e.g., Thurow, America Adrift: Today; We're Not Facing Up to Our Nation's
Problems, Wash. Post, Feb. 11, 1990, at C1.
173. Germany is Reunited, L.A. Times, Oct. 3, 1990, at Al, col. 6.
174. It will be necessary to deal with East German pollution and industrial dereliction and
to modernize factories to prevent future environmental damage. Sunday Telegraph, Mar. 11,
1990.
175. Id.
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At the same time, Western Europe recognizes that a cooperative
unified Germany is certain to augment its own political and economic
well-being. Indeed it is very much in Western Europe's interest to
fuel the pace of European integration.76
Nonetheless, the potential threat a unified Germany may pose is
a factor Western Europe must entertain. Undoubtedly, it will play a
role in determining the extent of involvement of Eastern Europe and
Russia in a free-trade zone. A stronger EC will help equalize the
greater political and economic clout of a unified Germany. i 7 Thus, the
likelihood of a European Bloc extending across the European Continent
and including the Soviet Union is a very real possibility and a source
of uncertainty to the United States.
There is little doubt that a world of blocs will be less hospitable
to open trade. The existence of these blocs may indeed lead to closed
markets and increased hostilities across the globe. 178 However, current
developments in Eastern Europe and Central America create world
trade and investment opportunities never before contemplated. While
blocs may come to frustrate these ends, they have the potential to
facilitate them.
A third block is forming on the other side of the Pacific. The
growing strength of the yen, acting as a suction for imports into Japan
from all over Asia, has prompted industry to move into South Korea,
Taiwan, Hong Kong and Thailand, where labor is cheaper. - One
result is an explosion of trade among East Asian countries and an
emerging industrial zone stretching from Melbourne to Sapporo.1Currently, relations between Japan and the United States are tense
and the future outlook is uncertain. 181 The outcome of current negotiations between the two countries will determine the course of future
trade relations. 1 2 Unless significant progress is made, particularly

176. Why We Must Keep the Germansin the Family, Daily Telegraph, Oct. 19, 1990, at 20.
177. See Improve Ties, supra note 166.
178. Reopen Talks to Avert Trade War, Chi. Trib., Dec. 11, 1990, at C18.
179. The Emerging Trade Threat, N.Y. Times, Oct. 24, 1988, at A17, col. 1.
180. Id.
181. William E. Brock, U.S. Trade representative in the early 1980's, stated that "we're
on the verge of a train wreck with Japan," which could lead to a trade war and possibly even
a diplomatic split. Pine, U.S. Deadlines to Put Pressure on Japan in Talks, L.A. Times, Feb.
19, 1990, at 1, col. 6. Kevin Kearnes, a Japan specialist at the State Department warns that
Japan and the U.S. "are on a collision course, heading for a continuing series of confrontations
on trade, foreign investment, technology transfer, foreign aid, industrial competition, defense
...both countries want to avoid the impending battle, but neither seems to know how." Id.
182. The U.S. and Japan have been currently engaged in negotiations over supercomputers,
satellites and wood products. These products were singled out for special trade negotiations by
Cara Hills, U.S. Trade Representative as required by Super 301 section of the 1988 Omnibus

Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 1990

29

Florida JournalFLORIDA
of International
Law, Vol.LAW
5, Iss.JOURNAL
2 [1990], Art. 1
INTERNATIONAL

[Vol. 5

with respect to Japanese receptiveness to an open economy, Congress
is likely to put protectionist legislation in place. Should this occur,
Japan will undoubtedly respond in kind and trade wars between the
two countries will likely surface.
3
Congress has recently attempted to reinstitute a 1988 amendment'1
to section 301 of the Trade Act of 1974.1- This effort is fueled by the
belief that Japan is moving too slow in opening its market to U.S.
competitors. '8 While the Bush Administration opposes the provision,
the deference Congress has previously granted the Administration in
matters of trade policy is unlikely to continue. 18
Leaders of both countries will be confronted with tough decisions.
President Bush is going to have to walk a tightrope between preserving diplomatic harmony with Japan and at the same time appeasing
the Commerce Department which advocates a far more aggressive
United States posture toward Japan. - Simultaneously, newly elected
Prime Minister Toshika Kaifu must satisfy both opponents within his
own party-S and President Bush.8 9
A major problem with trade between the two countries is that the
Japanese market has been extremely difficult for United States firms
to penetrate. 9 Japan's cutting of tariffs and elimination of government-imposed barriers does not necessarily help; the Japanese
economic structure involves interlocking business relationships and a
closed product-distribution system.191 These internal, almost covert,

Trade and Competitiveness Act. U.S.-Japan Reach Agreement on Satellites, Investor's Daily,
Apr. 14, 1990 [hereinafter Satellites].
183. The Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-418, 102 Stat.
1107 [codified at 19 U.S.C. § 2411 (1988)]. This amendment identifies "priority" nations and
practices resulting in foreign barriers and sets deadlines for negotiation and retaliation. Some
in Congress Harder on Trade, N.Y. Times, Jan. 28, 1991. Both the Executive branch and
foreign law partners oppose the measure because they believe its rigid structure will result in
retaliation. Id. However, members of Congress support the legislation. Id.
184. Id.
185. Id.
186. Id.
187. Id.
188. For example, factions of Japan's ruling Liberal Democratic Party are opposed to American demands that a law placing a 10 year wait on the opening of large stores be eliminated.
This law is aimed at protecting Japan's numerous small retailers. The U.S. interest derives
from the fact that large stores generally carry more imports. Farnsworth, Efforts to Speed
U.S.-Japan Trade Talks Are Working, N.Y. Times, Apr. 2, 1990, at 2, col. 1.
189. In early March, President Bush and Prime Minister Kaifu met in Palm Springs, California where Bush placed pressure on Japan to relax trade barriers. Id.
190. Pine, supra note 181.
191. Id.
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policies result in discrimination to foreign countries. For a long time
the Japanese have been promising that increased business opportunities would be made available to United States firms.192 However,
many members of Congress feel that Japan has been so intransigent
that it deserves United States retaliation.' 93 And indeed, if Japan does
not come through with reasonable concessions, Congress may well
consider such a course of action.- 9
For an extended period of time the prevailing outlook for JapaneseAmerican relations was pessimistic. However, enhanced efforts to ease
trade frictions have been fruitful. 195 Recently, agreements to open
Japanese markets to numerous American businesses have been
reached.196 These agreements involve telecommunications equipment,
supercomputers, and satellites. 9 Additionally, Japanese and United
States trade negotiators have agreed to vigorously pursue more joint
chip ventures. These concessions were undoubtedly spurred by Congress' readiness to implement protectionist legislation aimed at
Japan. - Japan's willingness to meet American trade demands will be
further tested when negotiators meet at the State Department for
talks on "structural impediments. '" °
Interestingly, not all pressure for Japan to compromise is emanating from the United States. A Japanese survey2° , found that approxi192. Id.
193. Senator John Heinz (R-Pa.) stresses that the Japanese have repeatedly reneged on
promises it has made to the U.S. government. Id.
194. Congress, under the aegis of the 1988 Omnibus Trade Act, is authorized, even required
to retaliate with its own protectionist policy.
195. See Satellites, supra note 182. This agreement ensures that foreign aerospace companies have access to the Japanese commercial satellite market. Id. Previously, all Japanese
satellites paid for by government or quasi-government agencies could be produced only by
Japanese firms. Id.
196. Id.
197. Id.
198. This will boost the U.S. share in the Japanese semiconductor market. In 1986, a
Japan-U.S. agreement was reached which was designed to create a 20 percent chip market for
the U.S. by 1991. Slow progress toward this goal prompted the recent meeting. Kyodo News
Serv., Apr. 4, 1990.
199. Not surprisingly, these concessions were made just weeks before interim reports were
due in Congress on developments in trade relations. Id.
200. These talks make up the fourth round of such negotiations. Farnsworth, supra note
188. "Structural impediments" refers to pervasive obstacles to trade which stem from public
policies and cultural habits (i.e., land-use policies that make doing business in Japan very costly).
Id. SII talks began last July at the suggestion of the Bush administration and until only recently,
little progress had been made. See Satellities, supra note 182.
201. The survey was conducted by Nihon Keizai Shinbun, a leading Japanese business
newspaper. Survey Shows Voters Resigned to Status Quo; Japanese Election, Reuters, June
28, 1986.
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mately 80 percent of the Japanese agree, at least in part, with American criticism that the Japanese economy should be more open. 2° With
public support, trade concessions may proceed at a much faster and
needed rate than previously expected.
Perhaps it is premature to expect that dispute over trade between
Japan and the United States is ended. While recent developments
have at least postponed the introduction of protectionist measures by
Congress, the dispute is likely to continue. 3 In addition to the fact
that a trade deficit will continue, Japan's strict compliance with the
agreements needs to be demonstrated. In the past, agreements that
were similarly aimed at opening the Japanese market to more goods
from the United States proved disappointing.- However, these failures have been attributed, in part, to vague language regarding key
points. 2°5 In an effort to cure this defect, the current negotiations
spelled out the definitions of key terms.- Still, further trade relations
are uncertain. Senator John C. Danforth °7 has urged the Bush Administration to demonstrate to Japan that it intends to enforce the 1988
Omnibus Trade Act.m
While pressure from the United States is mounting, the changing
global climate is creating desirable investment opportunities in Eastern
Europe, Latin America, and East Asia. One possible explanation for
Japan's continued defiance of United States requests for beneficial
trade opportunities is that as Japan continues to make inroads in
lucrative Asian and European markets, the United States becomes
less important to Japan. Hence, the pressure that the United States
can exert on Japan is greatly diminished.
If the United States trade deficit with Japan widens, hostility
toward the Japanese- will intensify. 210 In response to America's in-

202. Id.
203. InternationalTrade Outlook '89, Daily Rep. for Executives, Jan. 25, 1989.
204. Id.
205. Id.
206. Terms such as "research and development" and "open procurement" have previously
lead to difficulties but have apparently been thoroughly dealt with. Id.
207. Senator Danforth (R-Mo.), who is a member of the Senate Finance Committee on
International Trade was a principal author of the 1988 Omnibus Trade Act. Id.
208. InternationalTrade Outlook '89, supra note 203.
209. A Times-Mirror survey indicates that, to most Americans, Japan represents the greatest threat to this country's well being. Pine, supra note 181. These polls suggest that the recent
surge in Japanese purchases of American corporations and real estate is fueling this anxiety. Id.
210. In 1989 there was a $49 billion trade imbalance between Japan and America. Over
the last decade, the gap was nearly $400 billion. P.M. Briefing, U.S.-JapanTrade Talks Resume,
L.A. Times, Apr. 2, 1990, at 3, col. 1. However, the trade deficit shrank in September, 1990,
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creased hostility toward Japan, and in an attempt to acquire greater
global economic and political power, 211 Japan may seek to break free
2
of its lengthy dependence on the United States.21
Regardless, Japan's presence in the United States is intimate and
serves Japan well. As a result, it is in Japan's interest that the United
States reduce its budget deficit and mend its financial system.2 1 3 However, if the Japanese continue to penetrate the United States market
and maintain barriers protecting their own, protectionism here will
increase. Japan will retaliate causing a trade war which could seriously
hurt the United States. The United States depends heavily on
Japanese investments to help finance our budget deficit. 214 And, in
addition to importing an enormous quantity of Japanese goods, we
export substantial amounts of farm products and industrial goods to
Japan. 2 15 A trade war would have similar adverse effects on Japan's
economy. If this were to occur, local trading blocs in North America
2 16
and East Asia would emerge.
However, with a growing global market, Japan may become less
interested in penetrating the United States market. Instead, Japan
may focus on the need to expand its influence in the Third World.
This would result in the United States remaining political and military
leader of the West at the cost of Western Europe and Japan playing
a larger role.217 Ultimately, this could inure to the benefit of all involved.

resulting from a drop in Japanese imports. Farnsworth, Import Fall Narrows Trade Gap, N.Y.
Times, Nov. 17, 1990, at 31, col. 6.
211. A recent book by a member of the Japanese Parliament, Shintaro Ishihara argues that
this move would be in Japan's best interest. S. IHIHARA, THE JAPAN THAT CAN SAY No
(1989). His views are not currently endorsed by the majority. Id.
212. Japan has already offered Latin American countries billions of dollars in debt write-offs
in exchange for increasing political influence in the region. See Guttman & Laughlin, Latin
America in the Pacific Era, 13 WASH. Q. 169 (Spring 1990).
213. As part of recent negotiations, Japan has asked the U.S. to cut its budget deficit,
increase its savings rate and improve its educational system. The U.S. is yet to respond to
these requests. Satellites, supra note 182.
214. Id.
215. See, Pine, supra note 181.
216. This sequence of events represents a worst-case scenario according to the Foreign
Policy Studies Center. Id.
217. The Foreign Policy Studies Center has proposed this scenario as a more likely outcome.
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CONCLUSION

It is the abiding Executive's faith that economic and political
liberalization will make the East bloc less dangerous to the West. But
President Bush appears to take the position that the United States
should be careful about how it decides to prod reform along. During
the remainder of his Presidency, Mr. Bush will face a reluctant Congress. 218 He can be assured of a friendly Supreme Court. 219 Indeed,
he knows that in fact the Court assumes little or no responsibility for
international affairs.- The decisions being made across the globe have
a direct impact on the policies the President and Congress determine
to be in the best interest of the United States. In turn, these policies,
uninhibited by constitutional constraints, will impact upon international
formulations. To the extent that President Bush is successful in outlawing protectionism nationally, particularly as East Asia and the
European Community contemplate their next moves, it is likely that
they will reciprocate. Whatever the escalation might bring, one point
is certain, the third co-equal branch of government, the Court, will
not "trivialize" the end result with domestic constitutional or international law concerns. 221
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